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Introduction 
 
Disinflation has been pursued successfully in Romania in recent years. Inflation came 
down from over 40 per cent in 2001 to 14 per cent in 2003 and is expected to be cca 9.5 
per cent in 2004. By 2007 it should come down to around 3%. 
 
The benefits of a low-inflation environment are unquestionable, as price stability is the 
ultimate objective of monetary policy. In addition, low inflation is a pre-condition for EU 
accession. There only remains the other critical question, namely, what is the proper 
strategy to achieve the ultimate objective. Different central banks have adopted strategies 
which place different emphasize on the various pieces of information, or elements of their 
decision-making process or different aspects of their communication policies. Inflation 
targeting (IT) is one of those strategies.  
 
The National Bank of Romania (NBR) plans to introduce IT in 2005. This regime brings 
a series of benefits to a central bank, including a clear focus on inflation. And the 
Romanian central bank needs an unburdening of its monetary policy for further 
disinflation. But three main contradictory pressures are likely to arise in the Romanian 
economic context. First, the requirements imposed by the achievement of nominal and 
real convergence in view of accession in European Union in 2007 and later in European 
Monetary Union push toward a policy mix which is able to ensure growth and further 
disinflation simultaneously. Second, under inflation targeting the ‘divine coincidence’ of 
inflation stabilization and real stabilization objectives can be achieved in specific 
economic circumstances. Third, the operational requirements of a ‘hard’ inflation 
targeting regime are unlikely to exist under the current monetary transmission conditions.  
 
The central question of this paper is under what circumstances inflation targeting can be 
implemented in Romania. Section one pays attention to the recent history of inflation in 
Romania. Section two presents the context of disinflation and dilemmas of the monetary 
policy. Section three reviews distinguishing features of IT monetary policy framework 
and the experience with IT in various countries. Section four examines challenges posed 
by IT implementation in Romania. Section five discusses policy choices. 
 
1.  Where does Romania’s monetary economy come from 
 
From the beginning of transition monetary policy had to carry the burden of a too slow 
restructuring of the economy. Price stability, which should have been the prime aim of 
the monetary policy, was frequently sacrificed and Romania’s image as a high inflation 
country was built up (Figure 1). The dramatically high inflation rates at the beginning of 
the 1990s were not a choice by central bankers uninterested in the pursuit of price 
stability, but rather because the only way to finance government expenditures in the 
absence of a functioning tax system (aside from borrowing) was seignorage. The 
monetary policy in the 1990s has faced multiple and varying objectives rarely consistent 
with the achievement of inflation reduction. Therefore the policy choice may appear 
unsystematic, myopic and even inconsistent with basic principles of what 
macroeconomic models sometimes suggest is good policy practice. Arguably, structural   3
features of the economy (including structural strain, which is illustrated by arrears
2) 
undermined the conduct of monetary policy. 
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Disinflation (figure 2) coincides with the institutional context created by a more 
independent NBR.
3 In 1998 inflation was 40.6 per cent. The strategy used monetary 
aggregates as an anchor.  Both the exchange rate and interest rates, as instruments of the 
monetary policy anchor were excluded; the first due to the small amount of foreign 
reserves and the second due to its unpredictable relationship with inflation. The NBR 
based its monetary policy on minimum reserves and frequent ‘deposit taking’ operations 
for liquidity control. In 1999, owing to the peak of the foreign debt service and the danger 
of insolvency the current account adjustment became the first aim of monetary policy; 
consequently, inflation climbed to 54.8 per cent. In 2000 inflation came down 40.7 per 
cent. The exchange rate was the anchor of monetary policy, but the need of financing the 
budget deficit and of keeping the current account deficit in reasonable limits prevailed 
over disinflation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: INSSE 
 
                                                 
2  Daianu (1994) 
3 According to Law 101/1998, which has replaced Law 34/1991, the fundamental objective of NBR was to 
ensure the stability of domestic currency with a view to maintain price stability. Only the latest Law 
312/2004 stipulates the fundamental objective as being the maintenance of price stability. 
 
Fig. 2 M2, CPI and ROL/USD exchange rate (monthly % change, y-o-y)
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In 2001 the target of 25 per cent was missed, but inflation declined to 30.4 per cent.  For 
the first time NBR succeeded to impose its interest rate policy, helped by declining 
interest rates on T-bills. NBR avoided a large real appreciation of the domestic currency, 
but failed again to sterilize the mounting liquidity following the purchases of foreign 
exchange. In 2002 the target of 22 per cent was outperformed and inflation went down to 
17.8 per cent. Parallel with disinflation NBR kept an eye on economic growth and 
external equilibrium. The control of monetary aggregates (via base money) continued to 
shape monetary policy. Liquidity was controlled through reverse repos and deposits 
taking.   
 
In 2003 the inflation target, of 14 per cent, was attained. The traditional conflict between 
disinflation and mitigation of the external disequilibrium tendency eased, while the euro 
was adopted as a reference exchange rate. Disinflation has gone further in 2004 and 
inflation is likely to be slightly below 10 per cent. NBR relied on the stability of the 
exchange rate as an anchor and the control of liquidity through heavy sterilization 
operations.
4 Keeping the budget deficit low has helped disinflation. 
 
2. The context of disinflation 
 
In mid-1999 Romania went through a short but serious financial crisis, and avoided 
default on the external debt by a drastic balance of payments adjustment, which involved 
a reduction by half of the budget deficit. Prior to the crisis, an overvalued ROL gradually 
eroded export competitiveness and depleted the NBR foreign exchange reserves.  Since 
2000, the NBR has pursued several policy goals in a direct way:  
(1) to rebuild and consolidate the stock of foreign exchange reserves and to prevent 
an excessive ROL appreciation (consistent goals);  
(2) to achieve gradual disinflation.  
 
Since the goals (1) and (2) are not mutually consistent, the NBR had to gear two 
instruments. To achieve the goals of recovering reserves and limit the real ROL 
appreciation so as to support export competitiveness, the NBR bought large amounts of 
foreign currency after 1999, to the point that its current foreign exchange reserves cover 
more than four months of imports. This substantial accumulation of reserves contributes 
to reducing the country specific risk and improving the credit rating of Romania and 
implicitly the terms of borrowing.  In turn, the cheaper access to the international capital 
comes with additional pressure on the NBR to buy foreign currency if it keeps fighting 
the ROL appreciation. When, at the end of the period (2002-2003), the NBR slowed 
down the pace of buying foreign currency, a slight appreciation of ROL against the 
reference currency basket happened.
5  
 
When the NBR bought foreign currency, it also injected liquidity in the economy, and 
these interventions were never fully sterilized. The monetary base (M0) and the money 
                                                 
4 The exchange rate pass-through between 1997 and 2003 was found large and fast (Gueorguiev, 2003) 
justifying the choice of exchange rate as basic anchor for disinflation. 
5 During 2002-2003 the currency basket has been made up of 60 per cent euro and 40 per cent USD. In January 2004 
the currency basket composition has changed to 75 per cent euro and 25 per cent USD.  In November 2004 the NBR 
announced that the basket was to become 100 per cent euro based.   5
stock (M2) increased throughout this period and the consequences on inflation were 
almost immediate.
6 Up to 2003 disinflation occurred while the NBR tried to prevent the 
ROL appreciation against the euro and the dollar. Since then ROL has undergone steady 
real appreciation against the reference currency basket
7.  
 
Unlike in industrial countries, where the Central bank is a net creditor of the banking 
sector,
8 in Romania as well as in the transition countries, which have recently joined EU, 
the Central bank is a net debtor. In Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic the 
monetary management consists in adjusting the monetary base by modifying the volume 
of borrowed resources from commercial banks (for one or two week period) under a 
regularly held call for tenders operation. The target instrument is the interest rate that the 
central bank pays for these credits. Of course, the interest rate the central bank must pay 
depends on interest rates reported on commercial bank deposits, reserves and private 
credits. This is an equilibrium price and is driven by market forces.  
 
Since 2001 the NBR has been borrowing resources for a one month period from 
commercial banks (what it is called ‘attracting deposits’). A difference with the former 
three central banks is that the target seems to be rather quantitative. It appears that the 
NBR has chosen an objective in terms of the volume of resources it wants to borrow (as a 
means to control liquidity), and then the interest rate so as to make sure that commercial 
banks want to lend.  
 
The NBR method of attracting deposits may have been quite effective in dragging 
liquidity,
9 but  is atypical, since most other countries follow the opposite strategy, that is, 
first choose and announce the interest rate, then see how many resources are attracted; in 
a third step, adjust the instrument if the target is missed. In the NBR procedure, the 
interest rate does not seem to have been the key decision variable; thus it may not convey 
high quality information about the monetary policy stance, in particular when some form 
of rationing occurs in the demand for borrowed resources.  
 
Arguably, the recent years’ successful disinflation has brought the interest rate pass-
through in Romania closer to other Central European economies (Tieman, 2004). But the 
heavy net debtor position of the central bank and commercial banks’ oligopoly status, as 
well as still immature financial markets, hinder an effective interest rate policy. 
 
                                                 
6 As put forward by Daianu and Vranceanu (2001), a shock to the money stock reached its maximum   
impact on inflation three months later.  
7 The currency basket was dropped (in favor of the euro) this November. 
8 For instance, the ECB will lend money for a one week period, in a reverse-repo operation. It alters the 
amount of borrowed reserves by tuning the marginal interest rate required on these resources. 
9 A Granger causality test over the inflation rate (INF) and the NBR liabilities towards commercial banks 
(LLNBR) (in logarithms) over the period 1998.01-2003.09 shows that the latter has a strong impact on 
inflation rates (in a six lag model). In a simple regression model (Daianu, Lungu, Vranceanu, 2004a), it 
comes out that: INFt = 5.33 + 0.26INFt-1 − 0.41LLNBRt-2 . The negative and statistically significant sign of 
the LLNBR coefficient suggests that the deposit attracting operations had a stabilizing impact on prices. 
(R2A=0.50).  
   6
Unsurprisingly, the rapid accumulation of foreign exchange reserves after 1999 and a 
contained expansion of the monetary base given these sterilization operations led to quite 
a bizarre monetary structure where, since 2003 the monetary base has been covered 
almost four times by foreign exchange reserves. In other words, the relationship between 
the monetary base and hard currency reserves has been tighter than in standard currency 
board agreements, where this ratio is one to one. This does not necessarily imply that 
Romania has abnormal reserves, but rather points to the underdevelopment of the 
banking sector and credit activity (low monetisation). 
 
 
3. Inflation targeting (IT) 
 
NBR announced its intention to introduce inflation targeting, as a new monetary policy 
regime, during 2005. The rationale would be to help continue disinflation (bring it to 
around three per cent by 2007) and bolster the central bank’s credibility. 
 
3.1 IT as a monetary policy regime 
 
The broadest definition of inflation targeting is a monetary policy framework that accords 
overriding importance to the maintenance of price stability. The narrower definition says 
that inflation targeting is a monetary policy framework based on the adoption of a 
monetary policy rule in which forecasts of future inflation play a central role, either in the 
form of instrument rules or of target rules. An instrument rule expresses the monetary 
policy instrument as a simple and usually linear function of deviation of a few key 
macroeconomic variables from their target level. A target rule expresses the monetary 
policy instrument as the solution to an optimization problem defined by a loss function 
describing the costs associated to deviations of specific goal variables from their target 
levels subject to the constraints imposed by the model of economy’s structure.   
 
Since monetary policy works its effect on inflation with significant delay (at least nine 
months and up to two years) inflation targeting is in fact an inflation forecast targeting 
(Svensson, 1997). Inflation forecasts are contingent upon the central bank view on the 
transmission mechanism, the current state of the economy and a planned path for the 
instrument. Complex econometric modelling and statistical inference building on high 
quality data and economic information is needed in order to produce reliable forecasts (a 
subjective assessment of the inflation path may be included too). All these highlight the 
logistical challenge linked with IT implementation. 
 
The inflation targeters are explicit about the long run inflation rate that constitutes price 
stability. The inflation target announcement aims at increasing credibility and anchoring 
inflation expectations. It is useful in establishing the political legitimacy for an 
independent central bank, especially when taking unpopular decisions.  
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3.2 The Economics of Inflation Targeting 
 
The strongest rationale of the inflation targeting regime is that under some reasonable 
conditions stabilization of prices is equivalent to stabilize the output around its natural 
level, the level of output that would prevail if there were no nominal rigidities 
(Blanchard, 2003). The equivalence holds in models with staggered price setting and 
rational expectations. Achieving the natural level of output though may not maximise 
welfare if it comes at the cost of large distortions in the composition of output. The class 
of models for which full price stability is optimal from the point of view of welfare 
maximisation requires a sum of restrictive assumptions (Woodford, 2004). 
 
One restrictive assumption is that there are assumed to be no shocks that would require 
the relative price of any good to vary over time in an efficient equilibrium. If, an efficient 
allocation of resources requires relative price changes, due to asymmetries in the way 
different prices are affected by shocks, maintaining the stability of a symmetric index of 
prices is not generally optimal (Aoki, 2001).  
 
The second restrictive assumption is the flexibility of wages. Although this assumption is 
one common in the sticky price models (Christiano et al., 2001), it might not be validated 
in practice. If both wages and prices are sticky with price stabilisation the real wage will 
be frequently misaligned as will be the relative wages of different types of labor if these 
are not set in perfect synchronization.  
 
The third restrictive assumption is the lack of market power and distorting taxes. In the 
case when these are present the equilibrium level of economic activity is likely to be too 
low on average. When this is true, not only is the flexible price equilibrium level of 
output different from the optimal level, but real disturbances will not shift these two 
quantities to quite in the same extent. This means that the gap between the level of output 
associated with a policy that maintains stable prices and the optimum level of output will 
be varying in time. As a consequence, it will not be possible to simultaneously stabilize 
inflation and the welfare relevant output gap. 
 
3.3 Experience with inflation targeting worldwide, in transition (emerging) 
economies 
 
Whether the macroeconomic effects of inflation targeting are better than the effects of 
any other monetary policy pursuing price stability is controversial. Levin et al. (2004) 
investigate the experience of inflation targeters and non-targeters since 1994 in a number 
of OECD countries and emerging countries. They find that inflation is more persistent for 
non-targeters especially when the focus is on core inflation and not CPI, GDP growth 
volatility is the same for targeters and non-targeters, but inflation volatility is higher for 
inflation targeters. However, they recognise that the extent to which the reduction to 
inflation can be credited to IT is not obvious. As for emerging markets (including the 
Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland), the results document that the introduction of the 
inflation target moves inflation expectations down gradually, the transition is a smooth 
one and not characterised by a break at the introduction of IT. Again, the question is the   8
extent to which the reduction of inflationary expectations can be due to the introduction 
of inflation targeting and not due to a whole range of other institutional changes (fiscal 
consolidation, a greater degree of central bank’s independence) which are introduced 
alongside with inflation targeting. 
 
Bernanke et al. (2001) analyse the macroeconomic effect of inflation targeting using 
three different tests. First, they use the so-called sacrifice ratio and Philips curve equation 
in order to decide whether disinflation has been achieved at a lower cost than otherwise 
expected. The results suggest that the adoption of inflation targeting in New Zealand, 
Canada, United Kingdom and Sweden did not alter significantly the real economic costs 
of achieving disinflation. Second, they test whether the private sector inflation 
expectations inferred from surveys or forecasters and from interest rate differentials have 
declined after targeting beyond the degree associated with a drop in inflation. The 
evidence from both the survey data and interest rate differentials suggests that the 
adoption of inflation targeting does not establish immediate credibility for monetary 
policy. However, inflation targeting does help to pin down inflation expectations as the 
new regime becomes established. The third test tries to determine whether the interaction 
between inflation, monetary policy and real GDP have changed following the adoption of 
inflation targeting. The results show that the economic performance of non-targeters over 
the period considered is not appreciably different from that of inflation targeters. 
 
Inflation targeting in transition economies has been a more challenging task than in 
developed countries. As experience with IT in transition economies shows, the central 
banks in these countries often missed inflation targets by a sensible amount. Jonas and 
Mishkin (2003) look at the potential difficulties and evaluate the outcome in the three 
East European countries, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland that claim to use the 
IT system. They conclude that although the progress with disinflation has been good, the 
relative high level of uncertainty in these countries makes it relatively difficult to predict 
inflation over the medium term as required by the inflation targeting framework. These 
difficulties result in frequent undershooting and overshooting of the inflation target. 
Undershoots of the inflation targets have resulted in serious economic downturns that has 
eroded support for the central bank in both Poland and the Czech Republic.  
 
The same conclusion arises from Daianu et al. (2004) study of the performance in the 
three East European inflation targeters. The central banks in all three countries have had 
limited success in hitting inflation targets. Moreover the inflation volatility has become 
larger. They point out several possible explanations. First, the difficulty in these countries 
to disentangle the source of the shock, which stems from the fact that the effects of 
structural changes these economies undergo overlap with those brought about by external 
causes. Second, there is the possibility for the monetary policy of pursuing multiple 
objectives. Fearing political tension these countries might assign higher weights to 
economic growth than the central banks would acknowledge and thus deviate in fact from 
the inflation targeting framework. Third, the fiscal policy, on an unsustainable path, 
might play a damaging role in influencing inflation expectations.  
 
4. Implementing inflation targeting in Romania   9
 
The European Commission’s Regular Report on Romania’s progress towards accession 
from October 2004 acknowledges that ‘…Romania complies with the criterion of being a 
functional market economy. Vigorous implementation of its structural reform program 
should enable Romania to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within 
Union.’ Moreover, 2007 (2008) is confirmed as the year of EU membership. 
 
The objectives of monetary and fiscal policy for the coming years are indirectly set by the 
requirements of nominal and real convergence criteria.  
 
Table 1. The constraints of nominal criteria for Euro adoption(data for in 2003) 
 Budget 
deficit (% 
of GDP) 
Public debt 
(% of GDP) 
Inflation 
(%) 
Interest rate on 
10 years € bond 
(%) 
Exchange 
rate stability 
Target -3  60 <2.8 <6.8  yes
Czech 
Republic 
-7.8 34.5 0.4 4.63(23/6/2014)  No
Hungary -5.5  56.8 4.7 5.5(6/5/2014)  No
Poland -4.6  44.8 0.8 4.5  (5/2/2013)  No
Slovakia -5.2  43.8 8.1 4.5(20/5/2014)  No
Romania -2.7  27 14.1 -  No
Source: Countries’ national banks 
 
The priority for the coming years, of the monetary and fiscal policies, should be given to 
preserve the momentum in disinflation and growth (See Table 1). The question is how 
fast Romania should bring down inflation to the EU rate without incurring an excessive 
output loss. The recent experience shows that an annual three-four per cent of real 
appreciation of the domestic currency is manageable against the backdrop of increasing 
remittances from abroad. But how would steady appreciation of the domestic currency 
impact on competitiveness over the longer run? Is inflation targeting an appropriate 
monetary policy regime? 
 
4.1 Rationale for adopting IT in Romania 
 
The adoption of IT could bring major benefits to Romanian monetary policy. First of all, 
by enlarging the projection period in which an inflation target is pursued, the central bank 
would escape from the trap of time inconsistency. Second, by adopting a single publicly 
acknowledged goal, such as inflation target pursued over medium term, the central bank 
could manage inflation expectations so that the required short run deviation from the 
target does not jeopardize the final goal. Third, the central bank might benefit from a kind 
of ‘demonstration effect’ by using a method adopted in some of EU’s newest members.  
 
In order to benefit from these advantages NBR needs to choose an appropriate time to 
introduce inflation targeting. Most inflation targeting countries have chosen to adopt the 
new regime only after having some initial success in lowering inflation from previously 
high levels; this has happened in Romania during 2001-2004. In order to gain credibility   10
for the new regime it is important to be able to meet the target with high probability. This 
means benefiting on proper logistics and a thorough understanding of the monetary 
transmission mechanism. A clear signal that both government and central bank support 
and share responsibility of the new approach enhances the success.  
 
The choice of the target is critical. The right target should mitigate the adverse effect of 
economic conditions, which could move away the inflation targeting from an optimum 
monetary policy. Although there is an agreement that inflation and not the price level be 
targeted and that the optimal target is not zero but a small positive rate of inflation, there 
is no consensus on what measure of inflation should be targeted. The choice of the latter 
depends on which characteristics of economy divert inflation targeting from an optimal 
monetary policy: wage stickiness, market power and distortionary taxes, relative price 
adjustments (a series of nominal rigidities).  
 
4.2 Features of the monetary economy in Romania 
 
Understanding the monetary transmission process is vital to the appropriate design and 
implementation of monetary policy (of IT). This proves to be a fairly challenging task 
even for developed economies when there is uncertainty about the way monetary 
impulses propagate into the real sector. In Romania the task is harder since the 
undergoing structural changes add more uncertainty regarding the economic effects of a 
given monetary policy measure. Uncertainties revolve around the “fiscal dominance” 
issue as well. It is essential to identify factors that influence the effectiveness of the 
monetary transmission mechanism significantly.
10 
 
4.2.1 The structure of the banking sector 
 
 As in other accession countries, banks hold by far the bulk of financial intermediation in 
the Romanian economy. The banking sector is largely dominated by a few private banks 
and a very large majority state owned bank (BCR, which is basically a market-maker
11) 
and is characterised by a low ratio of assets to GDP. At the end of 2003 the share of 
banks’ total assets in GDP was 33 per cent (this ratio is one of the lowest compared to 
other Eastern European economies). Moreover, the banking sector has all the 
characteristics of an oligopoly (Antohi et al. 2003). In the first semester of 2004 the five 
largest banks representing 13% of total banks held around 62% of assets and deposits, 
and 58% of loans. This degree of market power diminishes the effectiveness of monetary 
policy, given that under such a market structure, the control of the central bank over 
                                                 
10 Traditionally, four channels of transmission of monetary policy have been identified in modern financial 
systems. The first is through the direct interest rate effect, which affects market interest rates. This in turn 
will affect spending, saving and investment behaviour of individuals and firms. The second channel is 
through credit availability. The third channel is through asset prices such as bonds, equities, and physical 
assets (for example housing). The fourth channel is through the exchange rate. In all this interplay 
expectations intervene significantly.  
11 Not un-frequently NBR has relied on BCR in order to relay its interest rate policy signals.   11
liquidity in the banking system is weakened (commercial banks may use their abnormal 
oligopoly profits to counter a NBR impulse).
12 
 
4.2.2 Low monetization  
 
The share of M2 in GDP has been fluctuating around 24 per cent over the last decade, 
which is extremely low as compared with developed economies and even with other 
transition economies. The low level of monetisation is indicative of major inefficiencies 
still at work in banking system and the lack of experience of private agents to use money 
as a coordination device. The low monetisation bears on the effectiveness of monetary 
policy. For instance, if private agents do not finance investment projects through bank 
credits or bonds, interest rates have less of an impact on economic activity.  
 
4.2.3 Euro/dollarization (on both asset and liability sides) 
 
In a partially dollarized (euroized) economy, the dollar (euro) is used in any of three 
classical role of money: unit of account, instrument of exchange and store of value, the 
more relevant being the first two (Calvo, 1999).  
 
Given the Romanian’s inflation history over the last 14 years it is therefore not quite 
surprising that dollar(euro)isation phenomenon is so entrenched. After reaching a peak of 
46% at the beginning of 2002 the proportion of hard currency component in M2 has 
steadily fallen to around 40 per cent at the end of 2003 and 35 per cent at the end of 2004 
against the backdrop of ROL’s sharp appreciation.
1314 Compared to other Eastern Europe 
economies, Romania is one of the highest dollar(euro)isated countries.
15 Asset 
substitution leads, inevitably, to an increased volatility of the demand for domestic 
money, which makes the management of monetary policy by the NBR more difficult. 
The success of disinflation and the ROL’s appreciation is likely to reverse currency 
substitution.  
 
Recent literature on financial crises focus on the other side of private agents balance 
sheets and put forward financial risks associated to liability dollarization, for example a 
situation where private and public debts are denominated in a foreign currency. As 
compared to currency substitution (asset dollarization), this is quite a different 
perspective on dollarization (euroization) and must be explicitly dealt with (Reinhart et. 
                                                 
12 There is a vast theoretical and empirical literature which shows that the impact of a given monetary policy on banks 
depends on the industrial organization of the sector. One implication of this is that larger banks are able, in principle, 
to shelter their profits from fluctuations in monetary policy. 
13 Arguably, the indicator used to measure the degree of currency substitution could somehow underscore 
the extent of the phenomenon since it does not include foreign currency in circulation due to the inherent 
difficulties in measuring the latter. 
14 As a comparison, Reinhart et al. (2003) has showed that between 1996 and 2001, the average ratio of 
foreign currency denominated deposits in broad money for a sample of selected emerging market 
economies was 18.4 per cent. In their sample Argentina had the highest ratio, 52.5 per cent, followed by 
Turkey with 45.9 per cent. 
15 In 2001 for example the ratio of foreign exchange deposits in M2 was 9.9 per cent for the Czech 
Republic, 13.3 per cent for Poland, and 30.1 per cent for Slovenia.   12
al. 2003). Various risks indeed may be connected to a significant dollar debt, in particular 
if the international value of the local currency can slide down.
16  
 
4.2.4 The informal sector and the demand for cash  
 
A factor that generates additional complications when attempting to forecast the effects 
of monetary policy on aggregate demand is the existence of a large informal sector, 
which, to some extent, explains why the demand for cash is so important in the Romanian 
economy. In general, the size of the informal sector has followed an upward 
trend,
17growing from a low of 9 per cent in 1993 to a (possible) high of 42 per cent in 
2000.
18Since then it has been on a decline.  
 
From a monetary point of view, the existence of a large informal sector increases the 
demand for cash (both ROL and hard currency). Since factors that affect the informal 
sector change, so does the demand for money. 
 
4.2.5 Size and openness 
 
As Romania is a small open economy, the exchange rate is by far the most important 
channel of the monetary transmission mechanism because, in contrast to other channels, 
it affects not only aggregate demand but also aggregate supply. A depreciation of the 
exchange rate, caused by a loosening of the monetary policy, for example, could induce 
firms to raise their domestic prices even in the absence of any increase in aggregate 
demand. Moreover, as exchange rate information is available instantaneously on financial 
markets, wages and prices tend to adjust before movements in import costs have worked 
their way to the cost structure. This is a particular feature of the economies with a high 
inflation track record, such as Romania.  
 
One indicator of a country’s degree of trade openness is the average share of foreign 
trade with respect to GDP.
19 In Romania, this share has been growing constantly since 
1998 --from 23 per cent in that year to over 40 per cent in 2004, which shows increasing 
integration within the world economy. Although the Romanian economy is one of the 
least open economies among the newest EU members, its trade shares are still higher than 
the average for the euro area.
20  
 
                                                 
16  See for an explanation of this balance sheet effect Aghion et al. 2001, Jeanne and Zettlemeyer, 2002. 
17 The reasons of why it has been so are multiple. Firstly, the choice of economic agents to operate in the 
informal sector is a natural response to avoiding an excessive tax burden (social security contributions 
are, probably, the highest in Europe). Secondly, because of a complicated mechanism of regulation an 
increasing number of companies have switched parts of their activities to the informal sector. Thirdly, a 
still underdeveloped financial system has increased the probability of economic agents to engage in 
informal cash transactions.  
18 Ciupagea, 2001; Albu et al., 2001; French et al., 1999. 
19 Exports plus imports divided by two as a share of GDP. 
20 According to the 1999 EBRD Transition Report the average share of trade in GDP for the EU candidate 
countries was 45 per cent.   13
NBR’s policy of a real appreciation of the ROL together with an impressive increase in 
the domestic credit have led to an increase of the current account deficit up to 5.8 per cent 
of GDP in 2003 and probably, beyond 6 per cent in 2004. This forced the NBR to 
postpone its plans for further capital account liberalisation. Among the transactions that 
were scheduled to be liberalised at the end of 2003 were trading by residents in foreign 
securities, short-term financial loans and credits (obtained by residents from non-
residents) as well as allowing non-residents to open ROL-denominated bank accounts 
and trade in domestic securities.
21 
 
The timing of the complete capital account liberalisation is important. A premature 
opening of the capital account could translate into a financial turmoil if other 
macroeconomic criteria are not met first (Daianu and Vranceanu, 2003). In a small open 
economy like Romania the world interest rate is given. Large speculative foreign inflows 
tend to exploit the interest rate differentials and thereby take advantage of the existing 
arbitrage opportunities. This would make the Romanian economy a potential target, as 
real interest rates here are high and so would ensure that a capital gain is realised.  
 
The low diversification of trading instruments in Romanian financial markets could limit 
speculative inflows to some extent. The Bucharest Stock Exchange Market (BSE) had a 
small capitalisation to GDP ratio of 9 per cent at the end of September 2004. The bond 
market is also underdeveloped with issuance of corporate bonds being virtually absent. 
Arguably, government T-bills are among most traded instruments but a tight fiscal stance 
imposes a ceiling on the quantity that is currently issued.
22
 Nonetheless, the range of 
financial instruments has only one direction to go and, thereby, it does not eliminate the 
threat posed by speculative flows.  
 
4.3 Structural constraints of IT implementation  
 
The ‘divine coincidence’, which is associated to inflation targeting, is not easy to achieve. 
Arguably, Romania’s economy does not fit into the class of models which ensures the 
simultaneity of inflation stability and output stability around its natural or optimal level. 
On the other hand, the dampening effects on economic activity of nominal rigidities 
could be counteracted by significant efficiency reserves which exist in the Romanian 
economy; these reserves could fuel growth in the years to come. But the issue posed by 
nominal rigidities is significant.  
 
Thus, relative prices need further adjustment. Administered prices represent still 21 per 
cent of total prices (which are included in the consumer price index). The productivity 
growth differential between the traded and non-traded goods is larger than in developed 
countries. And the relative price of non-traded goods to traded goods would tend to 
                                                 
21 Some of the capital control regulations have been changed, however. For example, from 2004 residents 
are allowed to take abroad any amount of foreign currency with the requirement to declare sums that 
exceed € 10,000. 
22 In September 2004 almost 50% of the total internal public debt of € 3.3 billion represented T-bills and 
12% represented T-bills issued in foreign currency (down from 14.4% registered in December 2002).   14
increase. Under a flexible exchange rate regime, as it will be under IT, the Balassa-
Samuelson effect will result in some combination of inflation and nominal appreciation. 
If the Balassa-Samuelson effect is large, the authorities in countries with flexible 
exchange rate regimes might feel compelled to allow the exchange rate to appreciate 
rapidly, which may attract more volatile capital inflows and hurt competitiveness. 
 
Second, wages might not be flexible enough in Romania. Iara and Traistaru (2004) found 
no evidence for the adjustment of regional average pay to local unemployment in 
Romania, unlike in Poland, Bulgaria or Hungary, where the unemployment elasticity of 
pay hover around -0.1 found in advanced economies. The new Labour Code does not 
help flexibility either.  Employment has declined by 2.3 million between 1990 and 2003, 
10 per cent of the decline having been during the last expansion cycle: between 2000 and 
2003.
23 In addition, most wages are pegged to the minimum wage. The frequency of the 
change in minimum wage and the magnitude of change have a considerable effect on 
wage dynamics. 
 
Third, concentration is high in many industrial sectors and gives considerable market 
power to economic agents. This can be easily seen in the case of basic products (steel, 
cement, and so on) and utilities.  
 
 
4.4 Policy implications of IT  
 
Inflation targeting in Romania would have to cope with a series of challenges, which bear 
on the concrete form of its implementation. 
 
4.4.1 The credibility challenge 
 
If targets are missed by large margins this would undermine the credibility of the new 
policy regime. In order to avoid this situation the models used need to be thoroughly 
worked out and tested. As mentioned already the construction and use of proper models 
is a formidable logistical problem in an economy that is still undergoing structural 
change.   
 
4.4.2 Overburdening of budget policy 
 
The co-ordination between monetary and fiscal policies is crucial in achieving 
macroeconomic stability (Mishkin, 2000). Given the choice of monetary targets to set 
prices, fiscal policy is significantly constrained because it has to achieve optimality in tax 
patterns, solvency, and ensure long-run consistency between debt and money holdings. In 
Romania fiscal policy has been rather restrictive over the last years.
24 However, the 
budget deficit picture is more complicated because of, primarily, two phenomena. The 
first is the social security system crisis. Within this, the pension system is probably in the 
                                                 
23 It seems that the recent growth cycle is jobless and productivity driven. 
24 The general government deficit has been cut from 5.4 per cent (without privatisation revenues) of GDP in 
1998 to an estimated 2.4 per cent of GDP in 2003. For 2004 the deficit is forecast at 1.6 per cent.   15
most precarious state. In 2004, Romania had three officially registered workers for every 
four retired persons. However, in Romania the picture is distorted by the fact that, out of 
the country’s working population of around 9.5 million, only 4.5 million appear to be 
employed. With around 0.6 million being unemployed the remainder of the labour force 
work either abroad or in the informal economy under the status of unpaid family worker 
or self employed. One should also consider the large part of the population in the rural 
area.
25  
 
Since 1996, the share of pension expenditure in total government expenditure has grown 
from 5.2 per cent to 14.2 per cent in August 2004. The pension costs will, undoubtedly, 
continue to pile up the pressure on the government expenditure. This phenomenon is 
likely to be further exacerbated by a declining birth rate and increased emigration with 
expected EU entry. Addressing the pension system issue means reforming the existing 
pay-as-you-go (PAYG) system, where pension expenditure in any given year is financed 
by that year's contributions in the form of payroll taxes.  
 
The second issue is the poor financial discipline that has been persisting within the 
economic system. The establishment of such a culture in which the non-payment of 
utility bills and other budgetary debts has been tolerated meant, in effect, that large 
implicit subsidies have been draining the budget. A large part of these arrears can be 
found in the energy sector. Low collection rates and a long-lasting policy of keeping 
prices below current costs have pushed in recent years the quasi-fiscal deficits in this 
sector to several percentages of GDP. Only in the last couple of years energy prices have 
approached market clearing levels. 
 
It is difficult to predict a time horizon under which the volume of arrears could be 
brought steadily under control. Therefore, the indirect potential future threat to the 
government budget is going to persist endangering the course of macroeconomic 
stabilisation. On should also factor in the expenses related to the implementation of the 
acquis communautaire.  
 
It is arguable that IT would strain the budget through its deflationary bias. And there 
could be a reverse of the fiscal dominance issue in this regard. This is why there is need 
for multi-annual budget programming and further fiscal consolidation. What brings some 
light, however, is that revenue collection seems to have improved lately. 
  
4.4.3 Excessive appreciation of ROL  
 
Due to massive capital inflows and ‘free floating’ and since full capital account opening 
is to happen by 2007, substantial real appreciation of the domestic currency is to be 
expected.
26 Unless productivity gains are adequate (substantial) a sort of a ‘Dutch 
disease’ could be in the making. This issue poses a challenge to exchange rate policy in 
the framework of IT. As Chang and Velasco (2002) said ‘how to float is the problem’.  
                                                 
25 In comparison, the ratio of workers to pensioners in Europe, already considered to be in the crisis zone, 
currently stands at four to one and is forecast to decline to two to one by the year 2040. 
26 See also Isarescu et.al (2003)   16
 
4.4.4 Possible large variability of output dynamics 
 
There is an agreement in the literature that a central bank should care about asset prices, 
including exchange rates, at least to the extent they influence inflation and output. Within 
an inflation targeting framework a forward-looking central bank would bear in mind how 
asset price movements affect output and inflation forecasts. 
 
These policy implications outline a policy challenge for NBR: what form of IT to adopt. 
 
5. Policy choices (MP and ERP) 
 
The Romanian economy has some distinct characteristics that ask for a careful 
consideration of the appropriate monetary and exchange rate policies. The large stock of 
arrears and potential future pressures on the government budget, such as the high cost of 
pensions expenditure or fiscal costs in the run up to EU entry, require a close co-
ordination of monetary and exchange rate policies with budget policy.  
 
NBR has announced publicly the introduction of inflation targeting in 2005. Arguably, a 
‘soft’ form of IT (a gradual introduction) is appropriate. This ‘soft’ monetary framework 
would focus on inflation but would consider shorter horizon (two-four quarters) than the 
medium term, would not neglect exchange rate completely, would work closely with the 
government on budget policy and would further delay the full opening of capital account. 
 
The ECB monetary policy regime is also an option to consider. Another option would be 
to keep the current policy and wait for better conditions in order to introduce IT. As some 
say ‘if it ain’t broke why fix it’. Trying to adopt a “hard” form of IT would be highly 
risky. 
 
5.1 Inflation targeting: why a ’hard’ version is not recommended
27 
 
The benefits derived from an IT regime, in terms of accountability and credibility, stem 
from using reliable conditional forecasts and using effective policy instruments. 
Obtaining a reliable conditional forecast is a difficult task. The relationship between the 
instruments is in general assumed to be known. In practice, the IT central banks need one 
(several) stable macro-econometric model(s) to get the inflation forecast and simulate the 
impact of a change in the set of instruments over the inflation path. Arguably, the interest 
rate on resources borrowed by the NBR from commercial banks (so-called ‘attracted 
deposits’) might be this instrument. Yet, the interest rate pass-through remains a policy 
challenge in view of the NBR’s massive sterilisation operations, the market power of 
some commercial banks and still immature domestic financial markets.
28 
 
Furthermore, it is the challenge of econometric modelling. It may be argued that for no 
country correct econometric models can be built. True, all models are subject to 
                                                 
27 See also Daianu, Lungu and Vranceanu (2004a ) 
28 Tieman (2004) is more optimistic in this regard.   17
estimation biases; furthermore, model parameters change when policy changes. But this 
is not the same thing to estimate a model for a relatively stable economy and with 
relatively stable policies (for example UK or Sweden) and an economy whose structure 
and policies change. Econometric modelling is almost an impossible task when the 
structure of an economy is changing, which is obviously the case for a transition country; 
that difficulty prompted ECB officials not to seriously consider a Euro-area macro-
econometric model (in particular, given that the adoption of the euro is altering the inner 
structure of the EMU). And the IT attempts in Central European countries are very 
‘loose’ in reality.
29 
 
NBR needs to improve its basic forecasting tools; without an appropriate bond yield 
curve tracking inflation expectations is quite hard. As a substitute, before a wide range of 
bonds with various maturities become available, NBR could implement some form of 
survey on inflation forecast of market analysts. Notice that it is difficult to forecast  the 
money demand given the weight of the informal sector and because shifts in expectations 
make private agents to arbitrate between local and foreign currencies, which all may 
legally be used as a store of value (and even as a transaction instrument).
30 Supply in the 
broad money stock is also hard to monitor since a substantial portion of the money stock 
is in hard currency and cash in circulation holds a large portion of base money.  
 
Given these uncertainties, the risks of taking decisions on the basis of a wrong two-year 
forecast are quite high. Today the NBR credibility is quite high, in view of the 
disinflation achieved until now. This capital of credibility can only be adversely affected 
if the NBR forecasts come out to be wrong systematically.  
 
What about the timing of IT implementation? If Romania has to follow (with a lag) the 
same path as the most advanced transition economies (Poland, Hungary, the Czech 
Republic) it may face massive capital inflows in the near future, which would push 
towards a sharp real appreciation of the domestic currency. To put some breaks on the 
decline in export competitiveness, from a social welfare point of view it may be useful to 
push down the interest rate. But independent employment and competitiveness goals may 
clash with the low inflation goal, so as required by the IT regime.   
 
                                                 
29 Levin et al. (2004) show that in emerging economies the weight of food in the price index is much higher 
than in developed economies. This increases inflation volatility, and makes more difficult for the 
policymakers the task of reaching their targets, with adverse consequences on central bank credibility; 
they also argue that most developing countries cannot afford to neglect the exchange rate, which is often a 
focal point for inflation expectations. But a dual objective is contradicting the IT principle. Levin et al. 
also show that in the emerging economies that adopted IT (including the Czech Republic, Hungary and 
Poland) there was no significant reduction in long term expected inflation after the introduction of IT. 
There was neither any significant reduction in short term expected inflation after the introduction of the 
IT; the downward trend in inflation expectations could be put forward well before adoption of IT. 
Another observation is that, in emerging economies adoption of IT has been frequently associated with 
overshooting or undershooting; possible explanations for missing the targets are: difficulties of 
controlling and forecasting inflations, the larger shocks, the lower credibility of the central bank. 
30 Antohi at al. (2003) document well the difficulties the NBR staff faced to forecast the demand for money.   18
Romania is set to join the EU by 2007; it must then set its monetary institutions and 
policy in line with the Euro area, so as to join, at a later date, the EMU. But the European 
Central Bank (ECB) itself is not a genuine IT central banker. Like the Fed, the ECB made 
the choice of flexibility, although it has precise quantitative targets in terms of inflation. 
Probably this would be an option for the NBR, as a pretty loose form of IT.  
 
The ECB experience is enlightening on several other issues; many empirical studies have 
shown that the ECB is not indifferent either to fluctuations in economic activity or the 
exchange rate. It seems that for a central bank, ‘flexibility’ is an asset at least as 
important as ‘credibility’. Early studies in the credibility of monetary policy argued that 
discretion is at the origin of all the evils in monetary management. In more recent 
analyses, it came out that if the lack of flexibility (discretion) casts serious doubts on the 
sustainability of the banking system itself, than the credibility risk may occur at a deeper 
layer.  
 
5.2 Exchange rate policy 
 
Romania’s foreign financial position is sound, with a satisfactory (and improving) 
country risk rating,
31 a relatively low external debt, and facing no difficulties in financing 
the debt service. The NBR stock of foreign exchange reserve is quite normal according to 
international standards.  
 
Lately NBR allowed for more flexibility in the determination of the exchange rate. This 
trend should continue. Direct interventions might still be conducted in an exceptional 
way, to fend-off speculative attacks or terminate a bubbly behaviour of the domestic 
currency.  
 
This does not imply a fully hands-off attitude over the international value of the ROL, but 
a managed, market-based influence of the NBR over the exchange rate, consistent with 
its price stability goal via its (direct or indirect) influence over short term interest rates. 
Flexibility in the realm of exchange rates will enhance the capacity of the NBR to pursue 
the goal of internal price stability by increasing the effectiveness of monetary policy; the 
latter’s effectiveness would be helped by controls on speculative capital flows.  
 
After the moment Romania joins the EU, it should also join the ERM2 (by 2009 or later) 
with a view of becoming an EMU member. This will shift NBR focus back from price 
stability to exchange rate stability. But the two goals are not inconsistent, since in the 
medium run the international value of the currency can be stable only if its internal value 
is stable.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
31 Fitch-IBCA raised Romania’s sovereign rating to investment grade (BBB-) in November 2004.   19
CONCLUSION  
 
All in all, Romania is on a favourable economic track: growth is back and inflation 
declines at a steady pace (Table 2). Further advance hinges on deepening structural 
reforms, with reducing overall economic inefficiency and quasi-fiscal deficits. The 
country seems poised to attract more foreign investment.  
 
In this context, in order to support effective monetary policy management, the exchange 
rate flexibility should be enhanced. In turn, this might call for more gradualism than 
currently agreed in the process of capital account opening.  
 
The characteristics of the Romanian economy do not favour the ‘divine coincidence’ if 
hard inflation targeting is implemented in the near future. The economy still needs 
substantial relative price adjustments, wages have to be more flexible, the economic 
structure shows too much market power, and the tax system is still pretty distorting. In 
addition, NBR needs to develop its own capacity to implement inflation targeting.  
 
Since NBR has announced its intention to introduce IT in 2005 a ‘soft’ form (a gradual 
introduction of this regime) is, arguably, a better choice than a hard version. A ‘soft’ IT 
framework would focus on inflation but would consider shorter horizon (two-four 
quarters) than the medium term, would not neglect exchange rate completely, would 
work closely with the government on budget policy and would further delay the full 
opening of capital account. 
 
An ECB-like system, as a very loose form of IT, is also an option (Issing, 2004). Under 
such an arrangement, the policymaker focuses on price stability too, but monetary policy 
management builds on the ‘just-do-it’ principle. In the case of a small and still fragile 
economy, flexibility does not clash with credibility, to the contrary, both back each other. 
Sophistication required by a genuine (hard) IT regime would introduce unnecessary risks, 
and additional noise in the economy, deemed to accentuate, not to dampen fluctuations.
32  
 
Table 2 Macroeconomic indicators, 1998-2004 
   1998 1999 2000 2001  2002  2003  2004.Q3 
bn  rol  373,798.2 545,730.2 803,773.1 1,167,687 1,512,616.8 1,890,778.3 2,254,600
1 
 
GDP 
Annual 
growth% 
change 
-4.8  -1.2 2.1 5.7  5  4.9 7.2
1 
CPI %  change  40.6 54.8 40.7 30.3  17.8  14.1  9.6
1 
                                                 
32 As Greenspan (2004) put it when referring to easing monetary policy in 1998 ‘the product of a low 
probability event and a potentially severe outcome can be judged as a more serious threat to economic 
performance than the higher inflation that might ensue in the more probable scenario’. The uncertainties 
clouding the way the monetary transmission works render the eventual inflation forecasts too approximate 
and make advisable embodying into the monetary policy a risk management policy. The central banks need 
to consider not only the most likely future path, but also the distribution of possible outcomes about the 
path.  
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Net 
foreign 
assets 
bn ROL  16,162.1  41,380.7  92,911.7  168,511.7  236,923.5  252,094.3  337,000.8 
Net 
domestic 
assets 
bn ROL  76,367.7  92,741.7  92,148.2  102,000.3  136,789  208,929.4  230,403.3 
Domestic 
credit 
bn  rol  79,919.3 101,340.4 112,885.5 143,244.7  200,221.1  301,225.5  354,638.4 
 bn rol  59,086.5  57,719.4  75,007.1  118,254.4 178,727.9 302,879.3  393,446.3  Non-
Governm
ent credit 
Annual 
growth, % 
change 
64.5  -2.3 30  57.6 51.1 69.5  29.9 
 bn rol  34,813.9  33,274.5  44,596.2  70,721.1 111,999.1 167,838.9  239,496.8  Foreign 
currency 
loans 
Annual 
growth, % 
change 
77  -4.4 34  58.6 58.4 49.8  42.7 
bn  ROL  92,529.9  134,114.3 185,060 270,512 373,712.5 460,741.3  567,404.1  Broad 
money, 
M2  
Annual 
growth, % 
change 
48.9 44.9  38 46.2  38.1  23.3  23.1 
T-bills 
with 
discount 
Average 
yield, % 
72.7 76  49.7  35.7 17.3  18  16.4 
Stock, 
daily 
average 
(bn lei) 
699.8 3,653.3 3,817.2  24,835.1  63,602.2  65,219.6  92,159  Attracted 
deposits 
Interest 
rate, % 
106.3 66.2 49.2 34.9  20.8  20.95 18.75 
Share of 
foreign 
currency 
deposits 
in M2 
(%)  32.6 37.6 40.4 42.8  39.3  37.1  35 
Bn  rol  22,109.7 29,668.9 46,331.1 64,308.8 88,304.6  113,259.8  142,811.3  M1 
%  growth  18 34.2 56.2 38.8  37.3  28.3  26 
mil €   -2,575  -1,355  -1,494  -2,488 -1,623 -2,877  -2,098
2  Current 
account 
deficit 
% in GDP  -8  -3.5  -3.6  -6  -3.4  -5.8       -6.2 
Budget 
deficit 
% of GDP  -2.8  -2.5  -3.6  -3.1  -3.1  -2.6    -1.6 
Rol/€  
(average) 
9,989.25 16,295.57  19,955.75  26,026.89 31,255.25  37,555.87  40,745.9  Exchange 
rates 
Rol/US$ 
(average) 
8,875.55 15,332.93  21,692.74  29,060.86 33,055.46  33,200.07  33,242.2 
Real 
appreciati
on (-)/ 
depreciati
on (+)  
against the 
basket
3 
  -5.7  -5.64  -2.37  -3.22  -4.9 
1 Estimated for 2004; 
2January-August, 2004; 
3 the basket was 0.6€ -0.4US$ up to 2003 and 0.75€-0.25US$ 
since 2003 
Source: NBR 
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Note: 
Daniel Daianu is professor of economics at the School of Political and 
Administrative Studies (SNSPA) in Bucharest; Dr. Ella Kallai is senior economist at 
Alpha Bank Romania  
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